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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from a final order (Summary Judgment) of the Third 
Judicial District of and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Honorable William 
B. Bohling). Robert L. Youngblood, II, the plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2-2(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), 
transferred this Appeal to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1. Whether the District Court committed reversible error when 
it, in granting summary judgment on Mr. Youngblood's underinsured motorist 
("u.i.m.") claim, summarily rejected Mr. Youngblood's contention that 
defendant-appellee Auto-Owners Insurance Company is equitably estopped to 
deny coverage in the face of evidence of Mr. Youngblood's reasonable 
reliance on statements made by Auto-Owners' representatives both prior to 
Mr. Youngblood's purchase of the subject insurance policy and prior to 
Mr. Youngblood's settlement of his underlying tort claim. 
(Standard of Review) 
Summary Judgment should be affirmed only if there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact and only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
1 
matter of law. The appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions 
for correctness. E.g., Andreini v. Hultqren, 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993). 
The appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling on appeal of a 
grant of summary judgment. E.g., Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 
588 (Utah App. 1993). On review of a grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 
(Issue Preserved in Trial Court) 
This issue was preserved in the District Court by Mr. Youngblood's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
62-116) and by his counsel's oral argument, presented on January 5, 2004, in 
opposition to that Motion. 
Issue No. 2: Whether the District Court committed reversible error when 
it granted summary judgment on Mr. Youngblood's claim that Auto-Owners 
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in the face of evidence 
presented by Mr. Youngblood that Auto-Owners engaged in an unreasonable 
delay in coming to a determination on his u.i.m. claim, unreasonably did an 
about-face with respect to its decision on that claim, and ultimately denied 
coverage when its agents had told Mr. Youngblood there was coverage. 
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(Standard of Review) 
Summary Judgment should be affirmed only if there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact and only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions 
for correctness. E.g., Andreini v. Hultqren, 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993). 
The appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling on appeal of a 
grant of summary judgment. E.g., Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 
588 (Utah App. 1993). On review of a grant of summary judgment, the 
appellate court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 
(Issue Preserved in Trial Court) 
This issue was preserved in the District Court by Mr. Youngblood's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
62-116) and by his counsel's oral argument, presented on January 5, 2004, in 
opposition to that Motion. 
Hi. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
This Appeal, in this claim for u.i.m. benefits and for breach of the 
insurance company's duty of good faith and fair dealing, is from the District 
Court's order granting Auto-Owners' motion for summary judgment entered 
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pursuant to the District Court's determination that the insurance policy at issue 
is clear and unambiguous; that estoppel does not apply; that this Court's 
decision in Perkins v. Great West Life Assurance Company, 814 P.2d 1125 
(Utah App. 1991), is controlling; and that Mr. YoungbloodTs claim for Auto-
Owners' breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing should be summarily 
dismissed. 
Mr. Youngblood alleged, in his Amended Complaint (R. 9-14), that he 
was entitled to u.i.m. benefits from Auto-Owners and that Auto-Owners had 
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in its handling of his claim for 
u.i.m. benefits. Auto-Owners in its Answer (R. 18-22) denied those 
allegations. 
After limited discovery, including the taking of the deposition of 
Mr. Youngblood, Auto-Owners filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 40-
41) and its Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. 42-61). Mr. Youngblood 
submitted his Memorandum in opposition to that Motion (R. 62-116), his 
Affidavit (R. 117-19), and the Rule 56(f) (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) 
Affidavit of his undersigned counsel (R. 120-24), suggesting the possible need 
for further discovery. Auto-Owners submitted its Reply Memorandum (R. 125-
37). 
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Oral argument was held on Auto-Owners' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on January 5, 2004. At the conclusion of that hearing the District 
Court, announcing its determination that the above-cited case of Perkins v. 
Great West Assurance was controlling, from the bench orally granted Auto-
Owners' Motion. The District Court's ruling was memorialized in its Order on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 148-49; copy set forth in the 
Addendum hereto at 01-02). 
This Appeal ensued. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about December 30, 1997 Mr. Youngblood was a 
pedestrian, walking across a parking lot toward a medical office, when he was 
struck by an automobile driven by one Rachel Louise Cooksey ("the 
tortfeasor"). R. 43; 50-51. 
2. The tortfeasor had $50,000 in available liability insurance. R. 45; 
56. 
3. Mr. Youngblood settled with the tortfeasor for her policy limits. R. 
45; 56. 
4. Mr. Youngblood has alleged that his damages, for injuries 
sustained as results of the tortfeasor's vehicle's striking him, exceed the 
$50,000 that was paid by the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. R. 45; 56-57. 
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5. The subject Auto-Owners policy includes a limit of $300,000 in 
u.i.m. coverage. R. 45. 
6. Mr. Youngblood was, at all times material hereto, the president 
and sole owner of Youngblood Home Improvement, Inc., the first-named 
insured under the subject Auto-Owners policy. R. 64; 77-94; 104. 
7. Prior to settling his claim against the tortfeasor for the $50,000 
liability policy limits, Mr. Youngblood, through his counsel, communicated with 
Auto-Owners regarding his intent to settle that claim for those limits on the 
condition that that settlement would not jeopardize his entitlement to u.i.m. 
benefits under the subject Auto-Owners policy. R. 64; 107. 
8. Auto-Owners, on August 7, 2001, by and through its agent, Bernie 
Cramer, formalized its agreement to waive its subrogation rights in connection 
with the u.i.m. coverage available to Mr. Youngblood under the subject policy. 
R. 64; 108. 
9. On August 31, 2001, Mr. Youngblood, in exchange for the 
$50,000 liability insurance limits, executed a Release and Settlement 
Agreement in favor of the tortfeasor; that Release document stated that it "is 
not intended to, nor shall it be construed to affect or jeopardize Releaser's 
[Mr. Youngblood's] underinsured motorist claim." R. 64-65; 109-11. 
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10. On October 23, 2001, Mr. Youngblood, through his counsel, and 
in response to requests by Auto-Owners' said Mr. Cramer, sent to Mr. Cramer 
a copy of the said Release, a copy of a sheet setting forth the limits of the 
subject liability policy, and documents evidencing the significant damages 
sustained by Mr. Youngblood in the subject auto-pedestrian collision, and 
setting forth Mr. Youngblood's u.i.m. settlement demand. R. 65; 112-14. 
11. On January 5, 2002, Auto-Owners, by and through another of its 
agents, George Sergakis, sent Mr. Youngblood's counsel a letter, indicating 
that its insured is Mr. Younqblood, and stating "we have determined this claim 
will be honored." (Emphasis added.) R. 65; 115. 
12. On March 11, 2002, Auto-Owners, through the same 
Mr. Sergakis, sent Mr. Youngblood's counsel another letter, one that again 
referred to Mr. Youngblood as its insured, but one that stated that "[fjurther 
review of the coverage" had caused Auto-Owners to take the position that, 
because Mr. Youngblood was not occupying the insured vehicle, "there is no 
coverage afforded to him for this loss and we will defend based on this issue." 
R. 65; 116. 
13. Mr. Youngblood relied, first in purchasing the subject policy of 
insurance, and second in settling his claim against the tortfeasor, on 
representations of Auto-Owners' agents that the Auto-Owners policy provided 
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him, personally, u.i.m. coverage, for auto-pedestrian accidents (first generally, 
and then for the subject accident in particular). R. 65-66; 76; 95-105. 
14. Mr. Youngblood was not informed that u.i.m. benefits would not be 
available to him because this was a corporate policy from whose u.i.m. 
coverage he could not as an injured pedestrian personally benefit. R. 66; 107; 
104-05. 
15. Mr. Youngblood, in reliance on the said representations of Auto-
Owners' agents, did not read the policy language that provides u.i.m. coverage 
to a pedestrian only if he is the first-named insured in the policy. R. 104-05. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The District Court committed reversible error in summarily 
rejecting Mr. Youngblood's claim that Auto-Owners is equitably estopped to 
deny u.i.m. coverage. At a minimum, triable questions of fact exist which 
should have caused the District Court to deny Auto-Owners' Motion with 
respect to Mr. Youngblood's claim that he is entitled to receive u.i.m. benefits 
from Auto-Owners. In relying on Perkins v. Great West Assurance, the District 
Court failed to distinguish the facts of that case from the facts of this case and 
failed to accord appropriate significance to observations of other courts, 
including the Utah Supreme Court, in other cases. This Court should reverse 
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the District Court's granting of summary judgment on Mr. Youngblood's u.i.m, 
claim. 
2. Mr. Youngblood's claim that Auto-Owners breached its duty of 
good faith and fair dealing is a claim that should be analyzed on its own merits. 
Auto-Owners' conduct in delaying resolution of Mr. Youngblood's claim for 
u.i.m. benefits, its doing an about-face with respect to the question of whether 
it would honor that claim, and its denying coverage in the face of 
representations of its agents, provides, at least as a question fit for jury 
determination, a basis for Mr. Youngblood to prevail on his claim that Auto-
Owners breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and this Court should 
also reverse the District Court's granting of summary judgment with respect to 
that claim. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN SUMMARILY DETERMINING THAT AUTO-
OWNERS IS NOT EQUITABLY ESTOPPED TO DENY 
COVERAGE TO MR. YOUNGBLOOD. 
Mr. Youngblood reasonably relied, at least as matters of triable facts, 
both in acquiring the subject policy and in settling his claim for the tortfeasor's 
liability policy limits, on representations of Auto-Owners' agents that u.i.m. 
benefits were available to him under the subject policy. Whether his reliance 
was reasonable in the circumstances is, at a bare minimum, a question of 
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triable fact. Auto-Owners' own statement (R. 65; 115) made months after 
Mr. Youngbiood's settlement of his claim against the tortfeasor, that Auto-
Owners would honor Mr. Youngbiood's underinsured motorist claim gives 
weight to Mr. Youngbiood's contention that, as a practical matter, Auto-Owners 
treated him as the named insured and gives weight to his estoppel argument. 
Auto-Owners was presumably long aware not only of its own policy language 
but also of the fact that Mr. Youngblood was a pedestrian when the subject 
collision occurred. The statement acknowledging coverage, made by Auto-
Owners' Mr. Sergakis in his January 5, 2002 letter (R. 115), appears to have 
been following up on and perpetuating Auto-Owners' commitments regarding 
the availability of u.i.m. coverage on which Mr. Youngblood relied in acquiring 
the policy and in settling his claim against the tortfeasor. 
In Ellerbeck v. Continental Casualty Co., 227 P. 805, 808 (Utah 1924), 
the Utah Supreme Court approvingly quoted the following language from a 
United States Supreme Court case: 
The principle that no one shall be permitted to deny that he intended the 
natural consequences of his acts when he has induced others to rely 
upon them is as applicable to insurance companies as it is to individuals 
.... This principle is one of sound morals ... and its enforcement tends 
to uphold good faith and fair dealing. 
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In United Amer. Life Ins. Co. v. Zion's First Natl Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 
161 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court described equitable estoppel as 
follows: 
Conduct by one party which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to 
adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first 
party is permitted to repudiate his conduct. 
In Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance, 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 
1991), the case on which Auto-Owners primarily relied in the District Court 
proceedings and the case on which the District Court based its decision, this 
Court stated: "Given Mrs. Perkins' failure to learn the terms of her insurance 
policy, her reliance [on the fact that payments had already been made under 
the policy there at issue] was not reasonable." Id. at 1131. This Court in 
Perkins cited cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that "[t]he great 
majority of states dealing with the doctrine of estoppel have held that it cannot 
be used to bring risks which were not covered by the terms of the policy within 
coverage of the policy." 
Auto-Owners is in this Appeal expected to contend that, by virtue of the 
Perkins case, Mr. Youngblood cannot win. Auto-Owners is expected so to 
contend regardless of the statements that were made by its agents, before the 
policy was purchased, and again, before Mr. Youngblood settled his claim 
against the tortfeasor, and even though Mr. Youngblood relied on such 
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statements. It is expected so to contend regardless of the fact that it knew, 
before Mr. Youngblood settled his claim against the tortfeasor, that u.i.m. 
benefits under the subject policy were important to him, and regardless of the 
fact that it first acknowledged that there was coverage and then changed its 
position on that question. 
Mr. Youngblood urges the Court to understand that its Perkins opinion 
did not mention and apparently did not consider the Utah Supreme Court case 
of Ellerbeck. Mr. Youngblood also urges the Court to understand that, in 
Perkins, the situation was different from the instant situation. In Perkins there 
is no indication of affirmative misrepresentations by agents of the insurance 
company. Nor, in Perkins (where a contention was made by the claimant that 
the insurance company was estopped, by virtue of its prior course of conduct 
of paying claims, to deny coverage), is there any indication that the claim that 
was the subject of the lawsuit was, for a time, accepted by the insurance 
company. 
The Court should ask itself whether it is good public policy that an 
insurance company be allowed to affirmatively misrepresent facts regarding 
coverage with impunity and then do a "King's X" based on language in an 
insurance policy that is unlikely that the average lay person would even read. 
The Court's affirming the District Court's ruling on Mr. Youngblood's claim 
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would work injustice not only to Mr. Youngblood but also to other victims of 
overzealous, careless, and/or unscrupulous insurance company salespeople 
and insurance company adjusters who fail to acquaint themselves with and/or 
for other reasons fail accurately to represent the particulars of their companies' 
policies' coverage provisions. 
The Court should consider the following passage from American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jefferv, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12225 (S.D. Ind. 2000). There 
the federal district court, in the course of denying the insurance company's 
motion for summary judgment in that coverage dispute, explained: 
Indiana courts have recognized that an insurer may be equitably 
estopped from denying coverage when the insurer's agent makes oral 
misrepresentations regarding the coverage provided by the policy and 
the purchaser reasonably relies on such misrepresentations. The 
Indiana Court of Appeals discussed the application of equitable estoppel 
under such circumstances in Village Furniture v. Associated Ins. 
Managers, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. App. 1989), In that case, an 
insured furniture company brought an action to determine whether its 
insurance policy provided coverage for losses due to a fire at its 
furniture store. The insurer had denied coverage based on a "sprinkler 
clause," which precluded coverage for fire damage when an insured had 
turned off its sprinkler system. The insured's representatives admitted 
that they had never read the insurance policy. They claimed, however, 
that they had informed the insurer's agent about the company's previous 
problems with the sprinkler system freezing during cold weather and that 
the company was procuring insurance because of this problem. The 
parties agreed that the agent had never mentioned the sprinkler cause 
to the company representatives. Id. at 307. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the 
insured had a duty to read the insurance policy and "to inform itself 
about its contract of insurance." Id. at 308. The Indiana Court of 
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Appeals reversed. The court recognized that, although an insured 
generally has a duty to read his insurance policy, an exception exists 
when an insurance company has "led the insured to believe that the 
specific coverage he had requested had been provided." Id. The court 
then quoted a Seventh Circuit case with approval: It is true that courts 
in Indiana and elsewhere, realizing that many people do not read their 
insurance policies and, perhaps even more important, do not do so 
because the policies are unreadable, have held that the agent's oral 
representations at the time of sale can override the written terms of the 
policy. If the agent insists to the prospective purchaser that the policy 
will insure against a hazard ... that the prospect is particularly 
concerned about, and the hazard materializes, the company may be 
estopped to plead the terms of the policy because the strength of the 
agent's oral assurances lulled the prospect into not reading, or reading 
inattentively, dense and rebarbative policy language. 
Id. Emphasis in original, quoting Burns v. Rockford Life Ins. Co., 740 
F.2d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted). The Indiana 
court then concluded that a question of fact remained as to whether the 
insured reasonably relied on the insurance agent's representations. 
In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to insurance coverage 
disputes, Indiana courts recognize an exception to the longstanding 
common law rule that a purchaser has a duty to read and understand 
the terms of his insurance policy. See Anderson Mattress Co. v. First 
State Ins., 617 N.E.2d 932, 940 (Ind. App. 1993) (noting that, although 
older cases imposed an 'almost unconditional duty on the purchaser of a 
policy to acquaint himself with its contents and to understand them,' 
more recent cases have 'recognized exceptions to the rule'); accord, 
Plohg v. N.N. Investors Life Ins. Co., 583 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind. App. 
1992) (The traditional rule has been that reliance is not justified where 
the injured party has a written instrument available and fails or neglects 
to read it. On the other hand, we have come to recognize that in the 
modern world ordinary, i.e., reasonable, care does not necessarily 
require a person to read something as complex as today's insurance 
policies.') (internal citation omitted); Medtech Corp. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 
555 N.E.2d 844, 849-50 (Ind. App. 1990) (noting that, although insured 
generally has a duty to learn the terms of her insurance policy, there are 
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'certain exceptions to this duty' including 'reasonable reliance upon an 
agent's representations'). 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12556, *10-*14 (some emphasis added). 
Mr. Youngblood brings this lengthy quotation to the Court's attention for 
the purpose of showing that his analysis is not at all unsupported by well-
reasoned judicial precedent. The analyses of the American Family case and 
the Indiana state court cases discussed in American Family seem to fit the 
facts here better than does this Court's analysis in Perkins. And those cases 
seem to be attuned, whereas the Perkins decision does not, to the Utah 
Supreme Court's Ellerbeck observation quoted hereinabove at 10. 
Other courts have also recognized the validity of the position advanced 
by Mr. Youngblood. In the oft-cited case of Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 
208, 218-19 (N.J. 1969), for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
observed: 
While there is a clear split of authority, with the decisions holding 
estoppel not available to broaden coverage presently representing the 
majority view, many of the cases so stating are confusing and not clear 
cut. ... The reasons generally advanced in support of the majority view 
are that a court cannot create a new contract for the parties, that an 
insurer should not be required by estoppel to pay a loss for which it 
charged no premium, and perhaps that a risk or peril should not be 
imposed upon an insurer which it might have declined. 
We are more impressed with the decisions in those jurisdictions which 
hold that equitable estoppel is utilized to bar a defense of non-coverage 
of the loss claimed, i.e., the minority rule. The following cases, arising in 
various contexts, are illustrative: Golden Gate Motor Transport Co. v. 
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Great American Indemnity Co., 6 Cal. 2d 439, 58 P.2d 374 (1936); Ivey 
v. United National Indemnity Company, 259 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1958) 
(applying California law); American Surety Co. of New York v. Heise, 
136 Cal. App. 2d 689, 289 P.2d 103 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Beach v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 409, 23 Cal. 
Rptr. 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Modica v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Company, 236 Cal. App. 2d 588, 46 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1965); Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 55 Del. (5 
Storey) 215, 190 A.2d 757 (1963); United Pacific Insurance Co. v. 
Meyer, 305 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Idaho law); Preferred Risk 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1967) (applying 
South Carolina law); Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Bechard, 80 S.D. 237, 122 N.W. 2d 86, 1 A.LR.3d 1124 (1963); State 
Automobile Casualty Underwriters v. Ruotsalainen, 81 S.D. 472, 136 
N.W.2d 884 (1965); Dodge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., V t , 250 
A.2d 742 (1969). 
These decisions all proceed on the thesis that where an insurer or its 
agent misrepresents, even though innocently, the coverage of an 
insurance contract, or the exclusions therefrom, to an insured before or 
at the inception of the contract, and the insured reasonably relies 
thereupon to his ultimate detriment, the insurer is estopped to deny 
coverage after a loss on a risk or from a peril actually not covered by the 
terms of the policy. The proposition is one of elementary and simple 
justice. By justifiably relying on the insurer's superior knowledge, the 
insured has been prevented from procuring the desired coverage 
elsewhere. To reject this approach because a new contract is thereby 
made for the parties would be an unfortunate triumph of form over 
substance. ... If the insurer is saddled with coverage it may not have 
intended or desired, it is of its own making, because of its responsibility 
for the acts and representations of its employees and agents. It alone 
has the capacity to guard against such a result by the proper selection, 
training and supervision of its representatives.... 
(Emphasis added.) See, also, Scarborough v. Dependable Ins. Co., 1993 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 219, *2-*4; Kramer v. United Services Auto Ass'n, 436 
So.2d 935, 936-67 (Fla. App. 1983). 
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In Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 739 P.2d 634, 638-39 (Utah 
App. 1987), this Court restated the rule of law that one may reasonably rely on 
affirmative assertions without further investigation except where, under the 
circumstances, the true facts should be apparent to one of his knowledge and 
intelligence from a cursory glance, or where he has discovered something 
which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived. Here, unlike the 
situation in Conder, there was nothing about the representations the Auto-
Owners agents made to Mr. Youngblood that should have caused him to 
believe that he was "being deceived." 
The Court needs to consider the proposition, advanced by Auto-Owners 
and apparently accepted by the District Court, that insurance companies can 
never be estopped to deny coverage, regardless of statements of their agents, 
simply because those statements are at odds with the contents of insurance 
policies. Mr. Youngblood, a person who is not particularly sophisticated with 
respect to the contents of insurance policies in general, or with respect to his 
own policies in particular, is certainly not unique in his reliance on what his 
insurance company representatives told him. Affirmance of the District Court's 
summary rejection of Mr. Youngblood's u.i.m. claim, based on Perkins, which 
may upon superficial analysis seem to mandate affirmance but which did not 
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involve affirmative misrepresentations by insurance company agents, would 
lead, as it has here to date led, to untenable and grossly unfair results. 
The Court should keep in mind the observation of the Utah Supreme 
Court in a case which, unlike this one, dealt with allegations of fraud but which, 
like this one, dealt with the supposed outcome-determinativeness of a 
document at odds with oral representations. In Berkeley Bank for Co-ops v. 
Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court explained: 
[The] principle of law [that one induced to make a contract by false 
representations can be relieved from the burden thereof by a court in 
equity] has been usually recognized by all courts and textwriters, and we 
do not feel disposed to depart from a rule founded, as it is, upon 
ordinary common honesty. 
(Emphasis added.) Although Mr. Youngblood does not seek to be "relieved 
from the burden" of his contract with Auto-Owners (he seeks the benefit of his 
bargain), recognition of the importance of "ordinary common honesty" seems 
to mandate, in the circumstances of this case, reversal of the District Court's 
ruling on his u.i.m. claim. 
The Court should determine, based on the distinguishability of the facts 
in this case from those of Perkins, based on the analyses of the Indiana and 
other cases discussed above, based on the Utah Supreme Court's 
observations in Ellerbeck and Berkeley Bank and this Court's observation in 
Conder, and in the interest of fair play and substantial justice, that there are, at 
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a minimum, questions of triable fact with respeat to Mr. Youngblood's estoppel 
argument. The Court should, accordingly, reverse the District Court's rejection 
of Mr. Youngblood's argument that Auto-Owners is estopped to deny coverage 
and the District Court's granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment with 
respect to his u.i.m. claim 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN SUMMARILY REJECTING 
MR. YOUNGBLOOD'S CLAIM THAT AUTO-OWNERS 
BREACHED ITS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING 
As is clear from a review of the Amended Complaint (R. 9-14; see, e.g., 
paragraphs 13-15 and 17), Mr. Youngblood contends not only that he is 
entitled to recover from Auto-Owners on his underinsured motorist claim but 
also that Auto-Owners has breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court held, among other things: 
... we conclude that the implied obligation of good faith performance [of 
a first party insurance obligation] contemplates, at the very least, that 
the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine 
whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter 
act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. 
... Despite what some courts have asserted [citation omitted], there is 
no reason to limit damages recoverable for breach of a duty to 
investigate, bargain, and settle claims in good faith to the amount 
specified in the insurance policy. 
(Emphasis added). 
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As is clear from this excerpt from Beck, the question of whether Auto-
Owners has acted diligently, promptly, and fairly in investigating and 
evaluating Mr. Youngblood's claim, and in communicating with 
Mr. Youngblood, is a matter that is in some respects independent of the matter 
of Mr. Youngblood's entitlement to u.i.m. benefits. Utah law, under Beck, 
appears to be that, even if it turns out that an insurance carrier does not owe 
u.i.m. benefits under a policy of insurance, the carrier is not justified in ignoring 
a claim or in failing to act promptly and reasonably in investigating and 
evaluating it. It seems to be consistent with the philosophical underpinnings of 
Beck and to make good sense and to be good public policy that an insurance 
company should not be allowed to prevail (in some instances, "get lucky") in 
connection with a legal determination or a jury verdict or arbitration award and 
have that judicial determination or verdict or award work, after the fact, to 
exonerate its undue delay or unfairness in processing the u.i.m. claim. 
The Court should, based on Beck and such dynamics, analyze 
Mr. Youngblood's bad-faith claim on its own merits (something that the District 
Court does not appear to have done — the District Court's ruling granting 
summary judgment on both of Mr. Youngblood's claims against Auto-Owners 
is fairly represented by its Order, set forth in the Addendum hereto at 01-02). 
The Court should consider, in light of the Supreme Court's above-quoted Beck 
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holding, the things set forth in paragraphs 6-15 of the Statement of Facts (see 
pages 6-8 hereof), including but not limited to the representations of Auto-
Owners' agents; Mr. Youngblood's reliance thereon; the fact that Auto-Owners 
knew that existence of, and pursuit of, underinsured motorist benefits was 
important to Mr. Youngblood's determination to settle the claim against the 
tortfeasor for policy limits; Auto-Owners' informing Mr. Youngblood that the 
subject u.i.m. claim would be honored; Auto-Owners' doing a 180° turn on that 
position; and the many-month delay in Auto-Owners' reaching the ultimate 
determination of the position it would take on Mr. Youngblood's u.i.m. claim. 
Given this history, the Court should, regardless of the outcome of its 
consideration of the District Court's summary rejection of Mr. Youngblood's 
u.i.m. claim, recognize that there are, at a minimum, triable questions of fact 
that remain to be determined with respect to Mr. Youngblood's bad-faith claim 
and, for that reason, reverse the District Court's granting of summary judgment 
on that claim. 
C. POSSIBLE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY AND 
THE RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT. 
The District Court should, at a bare minimum, have allowed 
Mr. Youngblood to take further discovery before ruling on Auto-Owners' 
Motion. Mr. Youngblood through counsel informed Auto-Owners, prior to 
Auto-Owners' filing of its Motion for Summary Judgment, that he was desirous 
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of taking depositions of Auto-Owners' Bernie Cramer and George Sergakis 
and other representatives of Auto-Owners who have been involved in the 
subject history. He also submitted the Rule 56 Affidavit of his counsel (R. 120-
24) for the District Court's consideration in the event that the District Court 
determined that further discovery would alter the landscape of the case for 
summary judgment purposes. The District Court apparently determined that 
no further discovery would alter the situation. 
Because Auto-Owners has appropriately acknowledged (e.g., paragraph 
4 of its "Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts" appearing in its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 126) that, for 
purposes of summary judgment proceedings, Mr. Youngblood's testimony, 
including statements of reliance, should be accepted, it is likely unnecessary 
for this Court to consider the question of whether the District Court should 
have allowed further discovery. In the event that this Court determines, 
however, that such discovery might significantly alter the landscape, this Court 
should remand at least for the purpose of allowing further discovery to be 
taken. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, Mr. Youngblood urges 
the Court to reverse the District Court's granting of Auto-Owners' Motion for 
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Summary Judgment with respect to (1) Mr. Youngblood's claim for u.i.m. 
benefits and his estoppel argument pertaining thereto, and (2) his claim that 
Auto-Owners breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing; and to remand 
for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 23+JL day of June, 2004. 
^ 
PETER C.COLLINS 
PETER C. COLLINS, L L C . 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
FIUE3 BEST&ST CiJUBT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 27 22Q<5 
ROBERT R. WALLACE #3366 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance 
,-, , ~ , x rr SALT LAKE COUNT/ 
Eagle Gate Tower
 By j 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 ~~ 1>eputy cierk 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. YOUNGBLOOD, II, 
Plaintiff, 
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant(s). 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDMENT 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Civil No. 010911647PI 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing on January 5, 2004. The 
plaintiff was represented by Peter Collins. The defendant was represented by Robert R. Wallace. 
The court heard oral argument, and read the memoranda on file with respect to this motion. The 
court finds that the insurance policy at issue is clear and unambiguous and that underinsured 
coverage does not exist for the auto-pedestrian accident at issue. The court further finds that 
estoppel does not apply, and that the case ofPerkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Company, 814 
P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991) controls on issues in this case. The court concurs in arguments of 
the defense, therefore: 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff on all claims, and all claims are dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated and entered this ^ ' day of January 2004, j gwv r . ^ . 
, V 7 ^% 
Judge William Bohling -v5i ^ f ^ f t ^ Q / o e 
State District Court Judge \ 0 .-^'^ffi^r ; % ^ ; fx^;/ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Peter Collins 
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